Abstract. We describe public key encryption schemes with security provably based on the worst case hardness of the approximate Shortest Vector Problem in some structured lattices, called ideal lattices. Under the assumption that the latter is exponentially hard to solve even with a quantum computer, we achieve CPA-security against subexponential attacks, with (quasi-)optimal asymptotic performance: if n is the security parameter, both keys are of bit-length O(n) and the amortized costs of both encryption and decryption are O(1) per message bit. Our construction adapts the trapdoor one-way function of Gentry et al. (STOC'08) , based on the Learning With Errors problem, to structured lattices. Our main technical tools are an adaptation of Ajtai's trapdoor key generation algorithm (ICALP'99) and a re-interpretation of Regev's quantum reduction between the Bounded Distance Decoding problem and sampling short lattice vectors.
Introduction
Lattice-based cryptography has been rapidly developing in the last few years, inspired by the breakthrough result of Ajtai in 1996 [1] , who constructed a one-way function with average-case security provably related to the worst-case complexity of hard lattice problems. The attractiveness of lattice-based cryptography stems from its provable security guarantees, well studied theoretical underpinnings, simplicity and potential eciency (Ajtai's one-way function is a matrix-vector multiplication over a small nite eld), and also the apparent security against quantum attacks. The main complexity assumption is the hardness of approximate versions of the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). The GapSVP γ(n) problem consists in, given a lattice of dimension n and a scalar d, replying YES if there exists a non-zero lattice vector of norm ≤ d and NO if all non-zero lattice vectors have norm ≥ γ(n)d. The complexity of GapSVP γ(n) increases with n, but decreases with γ(n). Although the latter is believed to be exponential in n for any polynomial γ(n), minimizing the degree of γ(n) is very important in practice, to allow the use of a practical dimension n for a given security level.
Lattice-based public key encryption. The rst provably secure latticebased cryptosystem was proposed by Ajtai and Dwork [3] , and relied on a variant of GapSVP in arbitrary lattices (it is now known to also rely on GapSVP [19] ). Subsequent works proposed more ecient alternatives [33, 30, 9, 28] . The current state of the art [9, 28] is a scheme with public/private key length O(n 2 ) and encryption/decryption throughput of O(n) bit operations per message bit. Its security relies on the quantum worst-case hardness of GapSVP O(n 1.5 ) in arbitrary lattices. The security can be de-quantumized at the expense of both increasing γ(n) and decreasing the eciency, or relying on a new and less studied problem [28] . In parallel to the provably secure schemes, there have also been heuristic proposals [11, 12] . In particular, unlike the above schemes which use unstructured random lattices, the NTRU encryption scheme [12] exploits the properties of structured lattices to achieve high eciency with respect to key length ( O(n) bits) and encryption/decryption cost ( O(1) bit operation per message bit). Unfortunately, its security remains heuristic and it was an important open challenge to provide a provably secure scheme with comparable eciency. Provably Secure Schemes from Ideal Lattices. Micciancio [20] introduced the class of structured cyclic lattices, which correspond to ideals in polynomial rings Z[x]/(x n − 1), and presented the rst provably secure one-way function based on the worst-case hardness of the restriction of Poly(n)-SVP to cyclic lattices. (The problem γ-SVP consists in computing a non-zero vector of a given lattice, whose norm is no more than γ times larger than the norm of a shortest non-zero lattice vector.) At the same time, thanks to its algebraic structure, this one-way function enjoys high eciency comparable to the NTRU scheme ( O(n) evaluation time and storage cost). Subsequently, Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [17] and independently Peikert and Rosen [29] showed how to modify Micciancio's function to construct an ecient and provably secure collision resistant hash function. For this, they introduced the more general class of ideal lattices, which correspond to ideals in polynomial rings Z[x]/f (x). The collision resistance relies on the hardness of the restriction of Poly(n)-SVP to ideal lattices (called Poly(n)-Ideal-SVP). The average-case collision-nding problem is a natural computational problem called Ideal-SIS, which has been shown to be as hard as the worst-case instances of Ideal-SVP. Provably secure ecient signature schemes from ideal lattices have also been proposed [18, 15, 16, 14] , but constructing ecient provably secure public key encryption from ideal lattices was an interesting open problem. Our results. We describe the rst provably CPA-secure public key encryption scheme whose security relies on the hardness of the worst-case instances of O(n 2 )-Ideal-SVP against subexponential quantum attacks. It achieves asymptotically optimal eciency: the public/private key length is O(n) bits and the amortized encryption/decryption cost is O(1) bit operations per message bit (encrypting Ω(n) bits at once, at a O(n) cost). Our security assumption is that O(n 2 )-Ideal-SVP cannot be solved by any subexponential time quantum algorithm, which is reasonable given the state-of-the art lattice algorithms [36] . Note that this is stronger than standard public key cryptography security assumptions. On the other hand, contrary to most of public key cryptography, lattice-based cryptography allows security against subexponential quantum attacks. Our main technical tool is a re-interpretation of Regev's quantum reduction [33] between the Bounded Distance Decoding problem (BDD) and sampling short lattice vectors. Also, by adapting Ajtai's trapdoor generation algorithm [2] (or more precisely its recent improvement by Alwen and Peikert [5] ) to structured ideal lattices, we are able to construct ecient provably secure trapdoor signatures, ID-based identication schemes, CCA-secure encryption and ID-based encryption. We think these techniques are very likely to nd further applications.
Most of the cryptosystems based on general lattices [33, 30, 31, 9, 28] rely on the average-case hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem introduced in [33] . Our scheme is based on a structured variant of LWE, that we call Ideal-LWE. We introduce novel techniques to circumvent two main diculties that arise from the restriction to ideal lattices. Firstly, the previous cryptosystems based on unstructured lattices all make use of Regev's worst-case to average-case classical reduction [33] from BDD to LWE (this is the classical step in the quantum reduction of [33] from SVP to LWE). This reduction exploits the unstructured-ness of the considered lattices, and does not seem to carry over to the structured lattices involved in Ideal-LWE. In particular, the probabilistic independence of the rows of the LWE matrices allows to consider a single row in [33, Cor. 3.10] . Secondly, the other ingredient used in previous cryptosystems, namely Regev's reduction [33] from the computational variant of LWE to its decisional variant, also seems to fail for Ideal-LWE: it relies on the probabilistic independence of the columns of the LWE matrices.
Our solution to the above diculties avoids the classical step of the reduction from [33] altogether. Instead, we use the quantum step to construct a new quantum average-case reduction from SIS (the unstructured variant of Ideal-SIS) to LWE. It also works from Ideal-SIS to Ideal-LWE. Combined with the known reduction from worst-case Ideal-SVP to average-case Ideal-SIS [17] , we obtain a quantum reduction from Ideal-SVP to Ideal-LWE. This shows the hardness of the computational variant of Ideal-LWE. Because we do not obtain the hardness of the decisional variant, we use a generic hardcore function to derive pseudorandom bits for encryption. This is why we need to assume the exponential hardness of SVP. The encryption scheme follows as an adaptation of [9, Sec. 7.1].
The main idea of our new quantum reduction from Ideal-SIS to Ideal-LWE is a re-interpretation of Regev's quantum step in [33] . The latter was presented as a worst-case quantum reduction from sampling short lattice vectors in a lattice L to solving BDD in the dual latticeL. We observe that this reduction is actually stronger: it is an average-case reduction which works given an oracle for BDD inL with a normally distributed error vector. Also, as pointed out in [9] , LWE can be seen as a BDD with a normally distributed error in a certain lattice whose dual is essentially the SIS lattice. This leads to our SIS to LWE reduction. Finally we show how to apply it to reduce Ideal-SIS to Ideal-LWE this involves a probabilistic lower bound for the minimum of the Ideal-LWE lattice. We believe our new SIS to LWE reduction is of independent interest. Along with [22] , it provides an alternative to Regev's quantum reduction from GapSVP to LWE. Ours is weaker because the derived GapSVP factor increases with the number of LWE samples, but it has the advantage of carrying over to the ideal case. Also, when choosing practical parameters for lattice-based encryption (see, e.g., [23] ), it is impractical to rely on the worst-case hardness of SVP. Instead, the practical average-case hardness of LWE is evaluated based on the best known attack which consists in solving SIS. Our reduction justies this heuristic by showing that it is indeed necessary to (quantumly) break SIS in order to solve LWE. Road-map. We provide some background in Section 2. Section 3 shows how to hide a trapdoor in the adaptation of SIS to ideal lattices. Section 4 contains the new reduction between SIS and LWE. Finally, in Section 5, we present our CPAsecure encryption scheme and briey describe other cryptographic constructions. Notation. Vectors will be denoted in bold. We denote by ·, · and · the inner product and the Euclidean norm. We denote by ρ s (x) (resp. ν s ) the standard n-dimensional Gaussian function (resp. distribution) with center 0 and variance
and Ω(·) to hide poly-logarithmic factors. If D 1 and D 2 are two probability distributions over a discrete domain E, their statistical distance
If a function f over a countable domain E takes non-negative real values, its sum over an arbitrary F ⊆ E will be denoted by f (F ). If q is a prime number, we denote by Z q the eld of integers modulo q. We denote by Ψ s the reduction modulo q of ν s .
Reminders and Background Results on Lattices
We refer to [21] for a detailed introduction to the computational aspects of lattices. In the present section, we remind the reader very quickly some fundamental properties of lattices that we will need. We then introduce the so-called ideal lattices, and nally formally dene some computational problems.
Euclidean lattices. An n-dimensional lattice L is the set of all integer linear combinations of some linearly independent vectors 
We will use the following results.
Lemma 1 ([29, Lemma 2.11] and [27, Lemma 3.5]). For any
Ideal lattices. Ideal lattices are a subset of lattices with the computationally interesting property of being related to polynomials via structured matrices. The
, there is a unique pair (q, r) with deg(r) < n and g = qf + r. We denote r by g mod f and identify r with the vector r ∈ Q n of its coecients. We dene rot f (r) ∈ Q n×n as the matrix whose rows are the
The strengths of our cryptographic constructions depend on the choice of f . Its quality is quantied by its expansion factor (we adapt the denition of [17] to the Euclidean norm):
where we identied the polynomial g mod f (resp. g) with the coecients vector.
We will concentrate on the polynomials x 2 k + 1, although most of our results are more general. We recall some basic properties of x 2 k + 1 (see [7] for the last one).
Lemma 3. Let k ≥ 0 and n = 2 Hard lattice problems. The most famous lattice problem is SVP. Given a basis of a lattice L, it aims at nding a shortest vector in L \ {0}. It can be relaxed by asking for a non-zero vector that is no longer than γ(n) times a solution to SVP, for a prescribed function γ(·). The best polynomial time algorithm [4, 35] solves γ-SVP only for a slightly subexponential γ. When γ is polynomial in n, then the most ecient algorithm [4] has an exponential worst-case complexity both in time and space. If we restrict the set of input lattices to ideal lattices, we obtain the problem Ideal-SVP (resp. γ-Ideal-SVP), which is implicitly parameterized by a sequence of polynomials f of growing degrees. No algorithm is known to perform non-negligibly better for Ideal-SVP than for SVP. It is believed that no subexponential quantum algorithm solves the computational variants of SVP or Ideal-SVP in the worst case. These worst-case problems can be reduced to the following average-case problems, introduced in [1] and [9] . 
lattice and solving SIS corresponds to nding a short non-zero vector in it. Similarly, Ideal-SIS consists in nding a small non-zero element in the
. . , g m ). It can be seen as a lattice problem by applying the rot f operator. Note that the m of SIS is n times larger than the m of Ideal-SIS. Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [17] reduced Ideal-SVP to Ideal-SIS. The approximation factors in [17] are given in terms of the innity norm. For our purposes, it is more natural to use the Euclidean norm. To avoid losing a √ n factor by simply applying the norm equivalence formula, we modify the proof of [17] . We also adapt it to handle the case where the Ideal-SIS solver has a subexponentially small success probability, at the cost of an additional factor of O( √ n) in the SVP approximation factor. 
The problem LWE is dual to SIS in the sense that if G ∈ Z m×n q is the SISmatrix, then LWE involves the dual of the lattice We will use the following results on the LWE and Ideal-LWE lattices.
Lemma 4. Let n, m and q be integers with q prime, m ≥ 5n log q and n ≥ 10.
Then for all but a fraction
Lemma 5. Let n, m and q be integers with q = 3 mod 4 prime and m ≥ 41 log q
Hiding a Trapdoor in Ideal-SIS
In this section we show how to hide a trapdoor in the problem Ideal-SIS. Ajtai [2] showed how to simultaneously generate a (SIS) matrix A ∈ Z Recently, Alwen and Peikert [5] improved Ajtai's construction in the sense that the created basis has shorter vectors: S = O(n log q) with m = Ω(n log q) and overwhelming probability and S = O( √ n log q) with m = Ω(n log 2 q). We modify both constructions to obtain a trapdoor generation algorithm for the problem Ideal-SIS, with a resulting basis whose norm is as small as the one of [5] .
Before describing the construction, we notice that the construction of [ for a super-logarithmic function a = a(n) = ω(log n).
3. In particular, for f = x 2 k + 1 with k ≥ 2 and a prime q with q ≡ 3 mod 8, the following holds:
We can set σ = 1 and r = 1 + log 3 q . Then, the error probability is
√ an log q) with probability 1−2 −a+O(log nm 1 r) for a super-logarithmic function a = a(n) = ω(log n).
In the rest of this section, we only describe the analog of the second construction of Alwen and Peikert, i.e., the case m 2 ≥ κm 1 , due to lack of space.
A trapdoor for Ideal-SIS
We now construct the trapdoor for Ideal-SIS. More precisely, we want to simultaneously construct a uniform a ∈ R m with R = Z q [x]/f , and a small basis S of the lattice A ⊥ where A = rot f (a). T ∈ R m 1 ×1 . We will construct a random matrix A 2 ∈ R m 2 ×1 with a structured matrix S ∈ R m×m 0 such that SA = 0 and S is a basis of the module M ⊥ (a), where A = [A 1 ; A 2 ]. We rst construct an HNF-like basis F of the module M ⊥ (a) with A. Next, we construct a unimodular matrix Q such that S = QF is a short basis of the module. More precisely, S has the following form:
Note that, by setting B lower triangular with diagonal coecients equal to 1, the matrix Q is unimodular.
In this design principle, we want F A = 0. Hence, we should set
Notice that, in order to prove that F is a basis of A ⊥ , it suces to show that H is a basis of A ⊥ 1 . The rst equation is satised by setting H be an HNFlike matrix (see below). By setting U = G + R, with G to be dened later on and R a random matrix, we have that A 2 is almost uniformly random in R by Micciancio's regularity lemma (Lemma 6). More precisely, the i-th row of R is chosen from 
where f = i≤t f i is the factorization of f over F.
We show below how to choose P and G such that P G = H − I m 1 . With this relation, the design principle form of S therefore implies that V = −H + P (G + R) = P R − I m1 , and D = B(G + R). Our constructions for P, G, B also ensure that P , B and BG have`small' entries so that S has`small' entries.
A construction of H without HNF. We start with how to construct H for such that the i-the element is 1 and others are 0, and Preliminaries of the construction. Hereafter, we set W = BG. We often use
, where t i,i = 1, t i+1,i = −2, and all other t i,j 's are 0. Notice that the i-th
An analogue to the second Alwen-Peikert construction
The idea of the second construction in [5] is to have G contain the rows of H−I m1 . This helps decrease the norms of the rows of P and V . To do so, we dene . For simplicity, we only consider the case where f = x n + 1. In the general case, the bound on S involves an extra EF(f, 2) factor.
We have that BG 2 = W 2 ≤ n, since the entries of h j are all 0 except one which is either h i * ,j or q − 1. Hence, we obtain that
It is obvious that P ≤ 1. Additionally, we have that P R 2 ≤ nr. Therefore:
which completes the proof of Theorem 2.
From LWE to SIS
We show that any ecient algorithm solving LWE with some non-negligible probability may be used by a quantum machine to eciently solve SIS with non-negligible probability. A crucial property of the reduction is that the matrix underlying the SIS and LWE instances is preserved. This allows the reduction to remain valid while working on Ideal-SIS and Ideal-LWE.
Theorem 3. Let q, m, n be integers, and α ∈ (0, 1) with n ≥ 32, Poly(n) ≥ m ≥ 5n log q and α < min and with probability
The result still holds when replacing LWE by Ideal-LWE f and SIS by Ideal-SIS f , for f = x n +1 with n = 2 k ≥ 32, m ≥ 41 log q and q ≡ 3 mod 8.
When α = O(1/
√ n), the reduction applies even to a subexponential algorithm for LWE (with success probability ε = 2 −o(n) ), transforming it into a subexponential quantum algorithm for SIS (with success probability ε = 2 −o(n) ). The reduction works also for larger α = O(1/ √ log n), but in this case only applies to polynomial algorithms for LWE (with success probability ε = Ω(1/Poly(n))). The reduction is made of two components. First, we argue that an algorithm solving LWE provides an algorithm that solves a certain bounded distance decoding problem, where the error vector is normally distributed. In a second step, we show that Regev's quantum algorithm [32, Lemma 3.14] can use such an algorithm to construct small solutions to SIS. Given an n-dimensional lattice L and a vector t = b + e where b ∈ L and e is distributed according to χ(n), the goal is to nd b. We say that a randomized algorithm A solves BDD χ for a lattice L with success probability ≥ ε if, for every b ∈ L, on input t = b + e, algorithm A returns b with probability ≥ ε over the choice of e and the randomness of A.
For technical reasons, our reduction will require a randomized BDD χ algorithm whose behaviour is independent of the solution vector b, even when the error vector is xed. This is made precise below. Denition 4. A randomized algorithm A solving BDD χ for lattice L is said to be strongly solution-independent (SSI) if, for every xed error vector e, the probability (over the randomness of A) that, given input t = b + e with b ∈ L, algorithm A returns b is independent of b.
We show that if we have an algorithm that solves LWE m,q;Ψ αq , then we can construct an algorithm solving BDD ν αq for some lattices. Moreover, the constructed BDD algorithm is SSI.
Lemma 7. Let q, m, n be integers and α ∈ (0, 1), with m, log q = Poly(n). On input t = b + e, algorithm A works as follows: it samples s uniformly in Z n q ; it computes t = t + As, which is of the form t = Gs + qk + e, where k ∈ Z m ; it calls A on t mod q and nds s (with probability ≥ ε/2); it then computes e = t − Gs mod q and returns t − e . Suppose that A succeeds, i.e., we have s = s . Then e = e mod q. Using the standard tail bound on the continuous Gaussian and the lower bound on ε we obtain that e has a component of magnitude ≥ q/2 with probability ≤ m exp(−π/(2α)
Suppose that there exists an algorithm
2 ) ≤ ε/4. The algorithm thus succeeds with probability ≥ ε/2 − ε/4 = ε/4.
We now show that an algorithm solving BDD ν αq can be used to solve a quantized version of it. This quantization is required for the quantum part of our reduction. The intuition behind the proof is that the discretization grid is so ne (the parameter R can be chosen extremely large) that at the level of the grid the distribution ν s looks constant.
Lemma 8. Let s > 0 and L be an n-dimensional. Suppose that there exists an SSI algorithm A that solves BDD ν s for L in time T and with probability ε. Then there exists an R, whose bit-length is polynomial in T, n, | log s| and the bit-size of the given basis of L, and an SSI algorithm A that solves BDD D L/R,s within a time polynomial in log R and with probability ≥ ε − 2
−Ω(n) .
At this point, we have an R of bit-length polynomial in T, n, | log α| and an SSI algorithm B with run-time polynomial in log R that solves BDD D L(G)/R,αq , for any G in a subset S ⊆ Z m×n q of proportion ≥ ε/2, with probability ≥ ε/4−2
over the random choices of e and the internal randomness w. In the following we assume that on input t = b + e, algorithm B outputs e when it succeeds, rather than b. We implement B quantumly as follows: the quantum algorithm B Q maps the state |e |b + e |w to the state |e − B(b + e, w) |b + e |w .
A new interpretation of Regev's quantum reduction
We rst recall Regev's quantum reduction [32, Lemma 3.14] . It uses a randomized BDD oracle B wc that nds the closest vector in a given lattice L to a given target vector, as long as the target is within a prescribed distance d <
of L (as above, we assume that B wc returns the error vector). It returns a sample from the distribution D L,
. We implement oracle B wc as a quantum oracle B wc Q as above. We assume B wc Q accepts random inputs of length .
1. Set R to be a large constant and build a quantum state which is within 2 distance 2 −Ω(n) of the normalized state corresponding to w∈{0,1}
2. Apply the BDD oracle B wc Q to the above state to remove the entanglement and obtain a state which is within 2 distance 2
−Ω(n) of the normalized state corresponding to x∈
3. Apply the quantum Fourier transform over Z n R to the second register to obtain a state that is within 2 distance 2
−Ω(n) of the normalized state
4. Measure the latter to obtain a vector b mod R· L. Using Babai's algorithm [6] , recover b and output it. Its distribution is within statistical distance 2
.
We now replace the perfect oracle B wc Q by an imperfect one.
Lemma 9. Suppose we are given an n-dimensional lattice L, parameters R >
, and an SSI algorithm B that solves
,s for L with run-time T and success probability ε. Then there exists a quantum algorithm R which outputs a vector b ∈ L whose distribution is within
. It nishes in time polynomial in T + log R.
Proof. The quantum algorithm R is Regev's algorithm above with parame-
2 , where B wc Q is replaced by the quantum implementation B Q of B. We just saw that if the BDD D L/R ,s oracle was succeeding with probability 1−2
−Ω(n) , then the output vector b would follow a distribution whose statistical distance to D L, 1 2s would be 2
−Ω(n) . To work around the requirement that the oracle succeeds with overwhelming probability, we use the notion of trace distance between two quantum states, which is an adaptation of the statistical distance (see [25, Ch. 9] −Ω(n) of the normalized state , as claimed.
To prove Theorem 3, we apply Lemma 9 to the lattices L(G) for G ∈ S, with algorithm B. For that, we need to ensure that the hypothesis αq <
